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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional scholars and human rights activists had high hopes

for the "transformative potential" of the South African Constitution.1
Today, ten years into our post-apartheid constitutional democracy,
Karin Lehmann, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of
Cape Town
(LehmannK@law.uct.ac.za).
1. See Nicholas Haysom, Constitutionalism, Majoritarian Democracy and
Socio-Economic Rights, 8 SAJHR 451, 459-60 (1992); see also Etienne Mureinik,
Beyond a Charterof Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution, 8 SAJHR 464,
472 (1992).
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approximately forty percent of South Africans remain unemployed,2
approximately thirty percent do not have either adequate housing or
access to piped water in their dwelling or on their site, and close to
forty percent lack access to hygienic toilet facilities.3 About fifty

percent survive, somehow, on an income of less than R500 per
month.4 Life, for the majority of South Africans, remains appallingly
hard, despite the socio-economic promises of the Constitution. 5 It is
not surprising that scholars, activists, and the poor themselves are
disappointed, and feel that the Constitution has not realized its
promise of transforming the lives of South Africa's poor. In their
disappointment, scholars and activists seek to apportion blame
between all three branches of government. The legislative and

executive branches are criticized for failing to formulate and
implement policies and programs that prioritize the needs of the
poorest of the poor.6 The judiciary, more particularly the
Constitutional Court, is criticized for its failure to hold the other
branches sufficiently accountable for their failures. Frustrated by the
slow pace of transformation, scholars have described the

2. The General Household Survey of 2003 put the unemployment rate at
30.2%, under the official definition and at 43% under the expanded definition.
STATISTICS SOUTH AFRICA, GENERAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY at x-xi, Statistical
Release
P0318
(July
2003),
available
at
http://
www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P0318July2005.pdf. The survey defined
"the unemployed" as those people within the economically active population who:
(a) did not work during the seven days prior to the interview, (b) want to work and
are available to start work within two weeks of the interview, and (c) have taken
active steps to look for work or start some form of self-employment in the four
weeks prior to the interview. The expanded definition of unemployment excludes
criterion (c). Id. at xxiv..
3. See id. at xi-xiv.
4. See World Bank, South Africa Country Brief, (Nov. 2005),
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/SO
UTHAFRICAEXTN/0,,menuPK:368086-pagePK: 141132-piPK: 141107-theSiteP
K:368057,00.html (estimating that "about 22 million South Africans live in 'third
world' conditions").
5. Public discontent with the slow pace of housing and service delivery
exploded into riots in May 2005. See, e.g., Rowan Philp, Protests Reflect a Crisis
of Dignity, SUNDAY TIMES (S. Afr.), May 29, 2005, at 5; Quinton Mtyala et al.,
Now Ocean View Erupts, CAPE TIMES (S. Aft.), May 31, 2005, at 6.
6. See, eg., Bryan Rostron, High Water Rising in the Cape, BUSINESS DAY (S.
Afr.), Dec. 13, 2005, at 11.
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Constitutional Court's socio-economic
"timid,"7 "deferential," and "flawed." 8

rights jurisprudence

as

The criticisms suggest that the court has had the opportunity to act
as a more effective agent of social change, but has missed that
opportunity. The opportunity presented to the court, say many of its
critics, was to give concrete meaning to the individual socioeconomic rights in the Constitution by identifying the minimum core
of each of the rights that have come before it. 9 Had the court done so,
the executive would have a clearer understanding of the
constitutional requirements in regards to progressive social delivery,
and individuals would, in turn, find it easier to hold the executive
accountable for its failure to deliver their most pressing needs.
Are these criticisms justified? I think not. The advocated minimum
core approach is both conceptually and pragmatically misconceived.
In critiquing the critics, I argue that the court was right to reject the
minimum core approach because it is inappropriate as a tool of
judicial decision-making. I consider the court's reasonableness
approach jurisprudentially sounder than the proposed minimum-core
alternative. However, I do take issue with the court's repeated
insistence that it will not examine how the public purse is spent. It is
this aspect of the court's jurisprudence, in my opinion, that should be
the target of vigorous criticism.
This paper commences with an overview of the three principal
South African socio-economic rights cases to date: Soobramoney,1 °
1
Grootboom,"
and Treatment Action Campaign.2 This paper
emphasizes the factual backdrop against which the court made its
7. Audrey Chapman, Core Obligations Related to the Right to Health and

Their Relevance for South Africa, in

EXPLORING THE CORE CONTENT OF SOCIO35, 56

ECONOMIC RIGHTS: SOUTH AFRICAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

(Danie Brand & Sage Russell eds., 2002).
8. David Bilchitz, Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core:
Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-economic Rights Jurisprudence, 19
SAJHR 1, 2 (2003).
9. See id. at 13.
10. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)
(S. Afr.).
11. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) (S.Afr.).
12. Minister oJ'Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002
(5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Aft.).
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decision in each case. This context is all too often glossed over by
critics who approach their analysis at a level of abstraction that
downplays the difficult, and purely utilitarian, nature of the choices
they argue the court should be engaging in. Beginning with an
examination of the cases, and then moving on to a consideration of
the minimum core concept itself, this paper hopes to demonstrate
that the choices involved in extracting a minimum core are utilitarian
rather than principled. As such, the minimum core approach is
inappropriate in the context of litigation related to the enforcement of
an individual's rights. This paper then argues that the processes
involved in arriving at the content of civil-political and socioeconomic rights are quite distinct: the former are a matter for
interpretation, the latter for determination. As such, it is disingenuous
to argue that all that is required of the court, in identifying the
minimum core, is to interpret socio-economic rights in the same way
it has interpreted civil-political rights. This paper concludes by
arguing that litigation should instead challenge instances of
government misspending, and that the court should be asked to direct
that the funds be spent, and spent appropriately, on the provision of
social goods.

I. THE CASES
There have been three socio-economic rights cases relevant to the
minimum core debate, two involving the right of access to health
care, 13 and one on the right of access to housing.14 A proper
understanding of the court's jurisprudence requires an appreciation
of the facts of each case and the socio-economic backdrop against
which each decision was taken. This backdrop is critical to
understanding the court's awareness of the tension between the
individual rights of the claimants and the utilitarian considerations
that underpin the allocation of scarce resources in all cases.

13. See id. at 722-23; Soobramoney 1998 (1) SA at 766.
14. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 48.
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A. SOOBRAMONEY V MINISTER OF HEALTH, KWA-ZULU NATAL

Soobramoney involved a challenge to the treatment available to
Mr. Soobramoney at a state hospital. 5 Mr. Soobramoney was a fortyone year old unemployed man who was in the final stages of chronic
renal failure at the time of application. 6 Regular renal dialysis could
have prolonged his life, but it is unclear for how long. 1"He could not
afford dialysis from the private sector, and so, sought it from a state
hospital. 8 However, the hospital refused his application because he
did not meet their eligibility criteria. 9 For, in addition to renal
failure, he was a diabetic who suffered from ischaemic heart disease
and cerebro-vascular disease.2 ° Since the demand for dialysis
treatment outstripped supply, the hospital's dialysis unit was already
over-burdened and only individuals who were eligible for a kidney
transplant were admitted onto the dialysis program.2' Mr.
Soobramoney did not qualify for a transplant because of his multiple
medical conditions.22 The refusal to admit him for treatment meant
that Mr. Soobramoney would die sooner than he would have
otherwise. This fact alone did not bring him within the scope of
section 27(3) of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o one may be
refused emergency medical treatment. ' 23 The Constitutional Court
felt that interpreting it as an "emergency" would have effectively
prioritized the treatment of terminal illnesses over other forms of
medical care, reducing the resources available to the state for
preventative health care and the treatment of illnesses or infirmities
which are not life threatening.24 Moreover, the court held that Mr.
Soobramoney could not succeed under section 27(1),25 the general
right of access to health care services, because the eligibility criteria
adopted by the hospital were reasonable given the resource
constraints it faced, and given the "agonising choices" inherent in
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Soobramoney 1998 (1) SA at 769.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 769-70.

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 769-70.
23. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 27(3).
24. Soobramoney 1998 (1) SA at 774.
25. S.AFR. CONST. 1996, § 27(1)(a).
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budgeting limited resources. 6 Providing dialysis to a patient with
chronic renal failure twice a week would cost the state R60,000 per
year,27 and Mr. Soobramoney's condition was so bad that he required
dialysis three times a week. 8 If the dialysis budget remained the
same, and Mr. Soobramoney received dialysis, someone else, and
probably more than one person, would not receive the treatment.
Moreover, the person who would be denied treatment would
potentially live longer than Mr. Soobramoney because he or she
would qualify for a kidney transplant. If the dialysis budget was
extended to provide for Mr. Soobramoney and others in his position,
it would be at the cost of the provision of other health services. In the
starkest terms, the choice was between Mr. Soobramoney's death
and the death or suffering of others. The medical authorities
determined that Mr. Soobramoney, and others in his position, should
die so that others might live. And this, said the court, was not a
decision with which it would readily interfere. To quote from the
judgment itself:
The provincial administration which is responsible for health
services in KwaZulu-Natal has to make decisions about the
funding that should be made available for health care and
how such funds should be spent. These choices involve
difficult decisions to be taken at the political level in fixing
the health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon
the priorities to be met. A court will be slow to interfere with
rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs
and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with
such matters.
• . . [T]he danger of making any order that the resources be

used for a particular patient, [is that it] might have the effect
of denying those resources to other patients to whom they
might more advantageously be devoted.29

26.
27.
28.
29.

Soobramoney 1998 (1) SA at 774-77.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 776.
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In reaching its decision, the court relied on the English decision of
R v. Cambridge Health Authority. 0 The court in this case
emphasized the hard utilitarian choices facing medical authorities:
I have no doubt that in a perfect world any treatment which a
patient, or a patient's family, sought would be provided if
doctors were willing to give it, no matter how much it cost,
particularly when a life was potentially at stake. It would
however, in my view, be shutting one's eyes to the real world
if the court were to proceed on the basis that we do live in
such a world. It is common knowledge that health authorities
of all kinds are constantly pressed to make ends meet. They
cannot pay their nurses as much as they would like; they
cannot provide all the treatments they would like; they cannot
purchase all the extremely expensive medical equipment they
would like; they cannot carry out all the research they would
like; they cannot build all the hospitals and specialist units
they would like. Difficult and agonising judgements have to
be made as to how a limited budget is best allocated to the
maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients.
That is not a judgement which the court can make.3
Scholars have not questioned the propriety of the utilitarian choice
informing the state's and the court's approach. Most accept that Mr.
Soobramoney's interest in prolonging his life had to be sacrificed in
the interest of the general welfare.32
B. GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA V
GROOTBOOM

A few years later the Constitutional Court heard Grootboom and
began to develop more clearly a general test for the adjudication of
constitutional rights.33 Grootboom involved a challenge to the state's

30. R v. Cambridge Health Auth., ex p B, [1995] 2 All E.R. 129 (A.C.).
31. Id. at 137.
32. For a detailed and critical analysis of the case see Craig Scott & Philip
Alston, Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A
Comment on Soobramoney's Legacy and Grootboom's Promise, 16 SAJHR 206
(2000). The authors accept the outcome of the case but are critical of the court's
reasoning. They argue that the court's interpretation of section 27(3) and its failure
to articulate a minimum core could lead to a situation in which "[t]he individual is
quickly sacrificed to an amorphous general good." Id. at 252.
33. Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46

170
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housing program under section 26 of the Constitution, which
guarantees that "[e]veryone has the right to have access to adequate
housing. ' 34 As with the section 27 right to health care, section 26 is
subject to the qualification that "[t]he state must take reasonable
legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to
35
achieve the progressive realization of this right.
Once again, it is important to appreciate the factual backdrop to
the case and the difficult reality facing choice-makers, those
responsible for drawing up policies and programs to ensure the best
utilization of limited resources. The case arose because of the
"intolerable conditions" under which the applicants were living.36
The applicants were squatting on private land from which the state
had sought to evict them.37 Prior to setting up home on the private
land, Mrs. Grootboom and her fellow applicants lived in shacks on a
recognized informal settlement called Wallacedene, near Cape
Town.38 Living conditions were so intolerable, "lamentable" said the
court, that the applicants were driven to leave the settlement and
unlawfully occupy private land.39 In Wallacedene "all lived in
shacks":
They had no water, sewage or refuse removal services and
only 5% of the shacks had electricity. The area is partly
waterlogged and lies dangerously close to a main
thoroughfare. Mrs. Grootboom lived with her family and her
sister's family in a shack about 20 metres square.
Many had applied for subsidised low-cost housing from the
municipality and had been on the waiting list for as long as
seven years .... 40

The general economic plight of residents in Wallacedene was
considerable; "a quarter of the households in Wallacedene had no
(CC) at 60-64 (S.Afr.).
34. S. AFR. CONST. 1996,
35. Id. § 26(2).

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

§ 26(1).

Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 53.
Id.
Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
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income at all, and more than two-thirds earned less than R500 per
month."'"
This is the reality of life for many, if not the majority, of South
Africans, and it is lamentable. In an attempt to escape this crushing
poverty, Mrs. Grootboom and her family removed their shacks to a
better area on private land, which had actually been designated for
future low-cost housing. 2 The owner of the land obtained an eviction
order against them, but the family remained in occupation because
they had nowhere else to go.43 At the beginning of the "cold, windy
and rainy Cape winter," Mrs. Grootboom and the other litigants were
"forcibly" and "inhumanely" evicted from the land they were
occupying." Their homes were bulldozed and their possessions
destroyed in practices that had been typical of the apartheid
governments.45
Mrs. Grootboom and the other applicants approached the court for
an order directing the state to provide them with "adequate basic
temporary shelter or housing.., pending their obtaining permanent
accommodation. '46 The court refused to grant such an order,
interpreting section 26 in a way that did not entitle Mrs. Grootboom
to obtain immediate relief. The court held that section 26 did not
"entitle[] the respondents [who had won in the High Court] to claim
47
shelter or housing immediately upon demand.
Despite holding that the state had no obligation to provide
immediate shelter to Mrs. Grootboom specifically, the court found
the state's housing program unconstitutional because it was

41.

Id. at 77.

42. Id. at 55.
43.

Id.

44. Id. at 56.
45. Id. The court presents a discussion of the connection between the apartheid
governments' influx control policy and the modem-day housing shortage in urban

areas. Id. at 54. The policy, which aggressively sought to limit the African
presence in urban areas, instigated a vicious cycle consisting of "untenable

restrictions on the movement of African people into urban areas, the inexorable
tide of the rural poor into the cities, inadequate housing, resultant overcrowding,
mushrooming squatter settlements, constant harassment by officials and
intermittent forced removals." Id.
46. Id. at 57.
47. Id. at 86
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unreasonable.48 It was unreasonable, even though it was a coordinated and comprehensive attempt by all spheres of government
to address the pressing housing needs in South Africa, because it
addressed only the medium and long-term housing needs (and did so
excellently well felt the court). 49 It made no provision for the shortterm housing needs of those "whose needs are the most urgent and
whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril."" °
Specifically, the court said that "[a] program that excludes a
significant segment of society cannot be said to be reasonable."51
The policy was unreasonable not only from the perspective of the
class of persons excluded, but also for the effect that such exclusion
could have on the national housing program as a whole. And it is this
that distinguishes the utilitarian approach in Grootboom to that
adopted in Soobramoney. In Soobramoney, sacrificing Mr.
Soobramoney, and others in his position, to the interests of the
majority did not have any potentially widespread adverse social
repercussions.52 In fact, the overarching public interest required that
he be sacrificed, as it. were. 3 In Grootboom, the interest of the
general public good required that some provision be made for those
in the position of Mrs. Grootboom. Sacrificing the interests of those
desperately in need of shelter, which the state felt was justified in
view of its overall housing scheme, would likely not have led to the
outcomes the state hoped for, namely the actual realization of
medium and long term housing needs.54 The reason such action
would not have lead to the fulfillment of national housing needs is
the spectre of continuing land invasions from the landless and the
homeless.55

48. Id. at 69.
49. See id. at 78-79.
50. Id. at 69.
51. Id.
52. See Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765
(CC) at 776 (S. Afr.).
53. Id.
54. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 69.
55. Id. at 54.
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At the outset of the judgment, the court identified the issues in the
case in the following terms.
The issues here remind us of the intolerable conditions under
which many of our people are still living. The respondents are
but a fraction of them. It is also a reminder that, unless the
plight of these communities is alleviated, people may be
tempted to take the law into their own hands in order to
escape these conditions. The case brings home the harsh
reality that the Constitution's promise of dignity and equality
for all remains for many a distant dream. People should not
be impelled by intolerable living conditions to resort to land
invasions. Self-help of this kind cannot be tolerated, for the
unavailability of land suitable for housing development is a
key factor in the fight against the country's housing
shortage.5 6
Later, the court repeats this concern in the decisive paragraph of
the judgment.
Not only are the immediate crises not met. The consequent
pressure on existing settlements inevitably results in land
invasions by the desperate thereby frustrating the attainment
of the medium and long-term objectives of the nationwide
housing program....
' * . It is essential that a reasonable part of the national
housing budget be devoted to this [the provision of short term
shelter], but the precise allocation is for national government
to decide in the first instance. 7
The court further held that when the state makes its budgetary
allocations, it must recognize that part of its obligation includes
meeting the immediate needs of desperate people. However, while
its consequent program must ensure that a significant number of
desperate people in need are afforded relief, the court held that it is

56. See id. at 53.
57. Id. at 78-79.
58. See id. at 79 (directing the national government to provide at least a
minimum level of "budgetary support" for the nationwide housing program).
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not a necessary part of the constitutional obligation on the state that
every desperate person receive relief immediately.59
Although the court, in the quotation above, may appear to be
suggesting that it would be willing to scrutinize budgetary
allocations, since it says that budgetary allocations are a matter for
the national government in the first instance, implying that there is a
second instance decision-maker, other portions of the judgment
indicate that if there is a second instance, it is not the court. Instead,
the unidentified second instance, if any, most plausibly refers to
scrutiny by other levels of government, rather than by the court itself.
C. MINISTER OF HEALTH V TREATMENT ACTION CAMPAIGN

Treatment Action Campaign is the most contentious and
jurisprudentially difficult of the three cases. The case involved a
challenge, by a range of organizations, to the government's refusal to
provide Nevirapine to HIV positive pregnant women at all state
clinics and hospitals. 60 At that time the government expressed
concern about the safety of Nevirapine, 61 and so decided to only
dispense Nevirapine at a number of designated test sites around the
country while the efficacy of the drug and the potential side-effects
and dangers attendant on its use were carefully monitored. 62 Doctors
at other public facilities were expressly prohibited from dispensing
Nevirapine. 63 The government did not have a timeline in place for
64
expected completion of testing and the national rollout to follow.
59. Id.
60. Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002

(5) SA 721 (CC) at 728 (S. Afr.). "Nevirapine is a fast-acting and potent
antiretroviral drug" routinely used to treat HIV/AIDS that was approved in 2001
by the World Health Organization for use in the prevention of mother-to-child
transmission HIV/AIDS at birth. Id. at 728 n.3. A mother taking Nevirapine to
prevent mother-to-child transmission would ingest a single tablet "at the onset of
labour and a few drops fed to the baby within seventy-two hours after birth." Id. at
729 n.5.
61. See id. at 743-44 (contending that the government feared the unpredictable
hazards associated with the drug's potency and doubted that the public health
system could distribute Nevirapine in the "comprehensive package" required for
effective use).
62. See id. at 741.
63. See id.

64. See id. at 733. (recognizing that the program was initially scheduled to last
for two years, but administrative delays and lack of concrete guidelines ensured
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The court found that, on the whole, the government had developed
a "formidable array of responses to the pandemic."65 Nevertheless,
the court found that the government's refusal to extend the provision
of Nevirapine was unconstitutional.6 6 Following its jurisprudence in
Grootboom, the court only examined the reasonableness of the
government's program.67 But, it is difficult to extract from the
judgment the principled basis on which the court decided that the
program was unreasonable. Essentially, it seems the court felt that it
was unreasonable to not provide Nevirapine since it could be
provided without straining the health budget and its efficacy and
safety were not seriously open to doubt.68
Based on the court order in Grootboom, one might have expected
that the court would order the government to formulate and
implement a comprehensive Nevirapine roll-out nationwide as soon
as possible. However, the court went beyond this and ordered the
government to remove all restrictions preventing doctors at public
hospitals from dispensing Nevirapine. Moreover, the court instructed
the government to provide Nevirapine for dispensing at public
hospitals and clinics, and to provide testing and counseling at such
facilities.69
What is fundamental to the court's decision, however, is the fact
that the cost implications of its order were negligible. The
government had admitted that the provision of Nevirapine was
within its available resources, and the court found that the additional
that Nevirapine would remain unavailable outside of the test sites for an indefinite
period of time).
65. Id. at 729.
66. Id. at 750. (reasoning that the limits on Nevirapine breached "the State's
obligations under section 27(2) read with section 27(1) (a) of the Constitution").
67. Compare id. at 754 (reiterating that "this Court has the duty to determine
whether the measures taken in respect of the prevention of mother-to-child
transmission are reasonable") with Gov 't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom &
Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 68 (S.Afr.) (stating that although the Legislative
and Executive are responsible for establishing a public policy program, "[t]hey
must, however, ensure that the measures they adopt are reasonable").
68. The court discusses both the budgetary concerns, and the safety and
efficacy of the drug. TreatmentAction Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 740, 745.
69. Id. at 765. This degree of judicial instruction has been criticized by some
who feel it is a clear case of the judiciary intruding on the executive domain. See,
Kevin Hopkins, Shattering the Divide - When Judges Go Too Far, DE REBUS,
March, 2002, availableat http://www.derebus.org.za.
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costs associated with providing testing, counseling, and breastfeeding were not at all significant.70 Moreover, the court emphasized
that HIV/AIDS is "the greatest threat to public health in our
country," while acknowledging that it is but "one of many illnesses
that require attention." 7 '
The case was therefore one in which the interests of the individual
HIV positive pregnant women and their children was commensurate
with the general public welfare that they receive treatment. The
overall economic and social costs in not preventing mother to child
transmission are considerable. In this case, utilitarian and individual
interests coincided. The court could, and was willing to as a result,
order the immediate provision of Nevirapine to HIV positive
pregnant women.
The confluence of individual interests, general welfare, and
affordability considerations made this an easy case to decide in a
legal sense despite the contentious nature of the debate in the public
arena as a result of the political controversy surrounding the
government's policy regarding the link between HIV and AIDS and
the public suspicion voiced by the President and the Minister of
Health regarding the use of anti-retrovirals v3

II. SCHOLARLY CRITICISM OF THE COURT'S
SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
Despite the fact that the court declared the government's policies
unconstitutional in both Grootboom and Treatment Action
Campaign, the court's jurisprudence has been much criticized.74 For
70. Indeed, the court recognized that Nevirapine was a "simple, cheap, and
potentially life-saving medical intervention." TreatmentAction Campaign 2002 (5)

SA at 749 (S. Afr.).
71. Id. at 754.
72. See, e.g., NICOLI NATTRASS, THE MORAL ECONOMY OF AIDS IN SOUTH
AFRICA 66-79 (2004) (demonstrating that it costs more to treat the opportunistic
infections and sickness suffered by HIV positive children than it costs to prevent
mother-to-child transmissions with regimens like Nevirapine).
73. The controversial position of President Thabo Mbeki and Minister of
Health Manto Tshabalala-Misimang has been extensively commented upon in the
press and in scholarly articles. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 7, at 59-60.

74. See, e.g., David Bilchitz, Giving Socio-Economic Rights Teeth: The
Minimum Core and Its Importance, 119 SALJ 484, 484 (2002) (arguing that the
court in Grootboom failed to provide a sufficient right of access to housing by not
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the most part, the criticisms leveled at the court have not been
directed at the court's determination of whether the executive's
conduct was constitutional or unconstitutional. Most scholars agree
with the outcome in each case. Instead, criticism has been leveled at
what is perceived as the court's undue and excessive deference to the
legislature and executive.75 This deference is thought to manifest
itself in two forms. The first is the criteria used by the court to decide
whether executive action is unconstitutional.76 The second pertains to
the form of relief granted by the court when a particular action is
declared unconstitutional.77
As far as the first criticism is concerned, which is one of substance
and is the more difficult to address, critics complain that the court
will adjudge a particular policy or program constitutional if it is
rational, reasonable, and made in good faith.7" Following Grootboom
recognizing a minimum core obligation); John Dugard, Twenty Years of Human
Rights Scholarship and Ten Years of Democracy, 20 SAJHR 345, 348 (2004)
(accusing the court of not going far enough to impose a minimum core requirement
in Soobramoney, Grootboom, and Treatment Action Campaign); Hopkins, supra
note 69, (criticizing the decision in Treatment Action Campaign for making policy
judgments better suited for other branches of the government).
75. See, e.g., Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 23-24 (characterizing the court's
"cautious" approach as overly deferential and advocating for the court's
supervisory jurisdiction in cases dealing with the implementation of socioeconomic rights); Murray Wesson, Grootboom and Beyond: Reassessing the
Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court, 20
SAJHR 284, 306-307 (2004) (arguing that the court should, but has yet to exercise
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure the protection of socio-economic rights). Wesson
describes supervisory jurisdiction as the "missing half of Grootboom." Id. at 307.
76. See Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 10 (viewing the court's reasonableness
standard as "amorphous" and as "a stand in for whatever the court regards as
desirable features of state policy"); Kevin Iles, Limiting Socio-Economic Rights:
Beyond the Internal Limitations Clauses, 20 SAJHR 448, 449-50 (2004)
(contending that the reasonableness standard gives the Court excessive "room to
mould [sic] the concept" to suit its own needs).
77. See Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 23-26 (arguing that the court must exert
supervisory jurisdiction over the government in cases dealing with the
implementation of socio-economic rights); see also infra note 80, and
accompanying text (questioning the court's good faith reliance on the government
and their ability and willingness to implement judicial orders).
78. The court is hesitant to interfere with "rational decisions" made in "good
faith" by authorities with responsibility over the matter in question. See
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at 776
(S. Afr.). In Grootboom, the court would not interfere with the legislative and
executive branches' authority over public housing programs, unless they adopted
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and Treatment Action Campaign, it is clear that the essence of the
judicial inquiry in most cases will be whether the particular policy or
program is reasonable. The court has thus not been willing to
declare, in respect to any of the cases brought before it, that the
individual applicants have an immediate right to obtain the socioeconomic good in question.7 9 The second criticism leveled at the
court is that it has not been willing to make orders that give it any
kind of monitoring or supervisory role over the implementation of
the order. In effect, the court trusts that the government will abide by
the order and formulate a policy that is reasonable.80
Human rights scholars feel that the reasonableness criterion is
vague and unclear. They are, as a result, critical of the court's failure
to take the opportunity presented to it to define, in concrete terms,
the parameters of each right. Bilchitz for example argues that:
[T]here is a need for the Court to clarify the state's
obligations imposed by socio-economic rights. This would
entail that the state is not left with an amorphous standard
with which to judge its own conduct, but would be able to
assess its conduct against clear benchmarks. The current
system of invoking the amorphous notion of reasonableness
does not provide a clear and principled basis for the
evaluation of the state's conduct by judges or other branches
of government in future cases.8

unreasonable measures. 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 68-9 (S.Afr.). Similarly, in
Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA

721 (CC) at 740 (S. Afr.), the court explained that the Constitution envisions a
"restrained and focused" court that evaluates only the reasonableness of
government action.
79. However, in Van Biljon v Minister of CorrectionalServices 1997 (4) SA
441 (CC) at 458-59 (S.Afr.), the Cape High Court held that the state must provide

anti-retroviral medication to certain HIV positive prisoners under Section 35(2)(e)
of the Constitution which guarantees to prisoners the provision of "adequate

medical treatment."
80. The court has declared executive action unconstitutional for being
unreasonable, and has ordered the executive to amend its policies to the extent that

they are unreasonable. It has not, however, insisted that the executive report back
to the court with its amended program, nor has it insisted that the actual litigants be
amongst the immediate beneficiaries of the improved program. See Treatment
Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 763.
81. Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 10.
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In the two "successful"--from the perspective of the litigantssocio-economic rights cases, Grootboom and Treatment Action
Campaign, amici curiae intervened and attempted to persuade the
court that there is a minimum core to each socio-economic right,
which the government is obliged to realize immediately.82 In both
cases, the court seemed to accept the validity of the concept of a
minimum core, but felt that it lacked the information and expertise
necessary to define and articulate the parameters of that minimum
core. 3 In Treatment Action Campaign, the court further suggests that
defining a minimum core would, in any event, be contrary to its
constitutional mandate because this type of decision-making goes
beyond what the court regards as "judicial" decision-making. In the
court's view, "judicial" decision-making only involves ensuring that
the legislature and executive have taken action through the adoption
and implementation of "reasonable" policies and programs.84 The
court therefore emphasizes its review role as a body that is entitled
only to judge the reasonableness of the conduct of the executive and
legislative branches of government, rather than its potential role as a
decision maker of first or last resort.85 In fact, the court states that it

82. See Grootboom 2001 (1) SA at 63-64 (urging the court to proactively
protect minimum core rights as called for by the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). The court, however, focuses on the key
differences distinguishing the Covenant from the South African Constitution. Id. at
64. See also Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 737-38 (voicing the
argument that section 27(1) of the Constitution establishes a minimum core right
vested in each individual). See generally Sandra Liebenberg, The Interpretationof
Socio-Economic Rights, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 1, 33-1, 3323 to -26 (contrasting the relative conception of the minimum core argued for by
the amici in Grootboom with the absolute conception of the minimum core argued
for by the amici in Treatment Action Campaign).
83. Grootboom identifies variables such as "income, unemployment,
availability of land, and poverty" as barriers to determining the "minimum
threshold for the progressive realization of the right" to adequate housing. 2001 (1)
SA at 65. In Treatment Action Campaign, the court acknowledges that the
"minimum core might not be easy to define, but includes at least the minimum
decencies of life consistent with human decency." 2002 (5) SA at 738.
84. See Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 740 (maintaining that
"[t]he Constitution contemplates rather a restrained and focused role for the
Courts, namely, to require the State to take measures to meet its constitutional
obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to evaluation").
85. Id.
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is ill-suited to make decisions that "could have multiple social and
economic consequences for the community. 8 6
Most human rights scholars are minimum core campaigners.8 7
Accordingly, they are highly critical of the court's unwillingness to
venture down the minimum core path.88 They find the various
objections raised by the court unpersuasive s9 I do not propose to
86. Id. Some scholars support the court's assertion, arguing that judicial
decision-making in cases involving social and economic questions produces
complicated and unforeseeable social repercussions. See, e.g., Marius Pieterse,
Coming to Terms With JudicialEnforcement of Socio-Economic Rights, 20 SAJHR
383, 392 (2004). However, numerous academics feel this concern is overstated.
Murray Wesson, for example, intimates that the judiciary might extract an
acceptable working definition of the minimum core from principles laid out by the
International Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Wesson,
supra note 75, at 301-02.
87. See Bilchitz, supra note 74, at 484 (disapproving of the court's deliberate
avoidance of the minimum core issue in Grootboom); Sandra Liebenberg, South
Africa's Evolving Jurisprudenceon Socio-Economic Rights: An Effective Tool in
ChallengingPoverty?, 6 L., DEMOCRACY & DEV. 159, 174 (2002) (dismissing the
court's justifications for rejecting the minimum core approach as "unconvincing");
Scott & Alston, supra note 32, at 264 (arguing that the outcome in Grootboom
would have been more satisfactory if the court employed a minimum core
jurisprudence); Geraldine van Bueren, Alleviating Poverty through the
Constitutional Court, 15 SAJHR 52, 57(1999) (declaring that "[i]t is the minimum
core approach which provides economic and social rights with a determinacy and
certainty"); Iles, supra note 76, at 458 (criticizing the court's "confused" approach
to the limitations clause as an inherent by-product of its rejection of the minimum
core approach to socio-economic rights).
88. See Bilchitz, supra note 74, at 500-01 (criticizing the court's ruling because
the standard of "reasonable measures" is indefinite in comparison to the minimum
core standard, the ruling lacked a time limit requiring short-term necessities to be
met by the Government, and the court failed to undertake a larger role in the
supervision of socio-economic rights enforcement); Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 5-6,
11-12 (decrying the court for failing to address the content of the right to access
health care, and for preferring a reasonable standard over the minimum core
approach); Dugard, supra note 74, at 348 (agreeing that the court should interpret
sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution to guarantee individuals minimum core
requirements); Iles, supra note 76, at 449-50 (criticizing the reasonable measures
standard because the court can "mould" it in such a way as to "avoid engaging in
socio-economic policy"); Liebenberg, supra note 87, at 174-77 (calling the court's
justifications for not using minimum core obligations "unconvincing" because,
contrary to what the court said in Grootboom, the court would not have to
specifically define what the minimum core obligations would entail); Pieterse,
supra note 86, at 407, 410-11 (finding the reasonableness standard to be "abstract"
and "unable to balance the needs for vigilance and deference").
89. Even scholars who feel that the court is right to be "suspicious" of the
minimum core concept are critical of the reasons the court has given for its
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examine the court's reservations and commentators responses in this
article, for they are thoroughly canvassed elsewhere. Distilled, the
essence of critics' concerns is that the court has failed to grasp a
golden opportunity to "fast-track" constitutional transformation by
using the minimum core to set clear benchmarks for the legislature
and executive, benchmarks that prioritize the welfare of the poorest
in South Africa. Liebenberg, arguably South Africa's foremost
human rights scholar, argues that:
The Court does not escape the interpretative difficulties of
clarifying the state's obligations in relation to socio-economic
rights by rejecting the minimum core obligation. The review
standard of "reasonable measures" endorsed by the Court
does not lend itself to easy definition or application. The
needs and opportunities for enjoying rights are surely also
relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the
measures adopted by the state. The component of the
reasonableness test requiring government programmes to
provide relief for those in desperate need and living in
intolerable conditions is vague and leaves many questions
unanswered. In the South African context of extreme and
widespread poverty, how does one define the groups that
government programmes must specifically cater for, and what
precise forms of relief must be provided? The obvious
response is that greater normative clarity will be developed
through a process of application of the Grootboom principles
to the facts of particular cases. A similar response can be
made to concerns about the indeterminacy of minimum core
obligations. As I have argued, the underlying purpose of
recognising minimum core obligations can guide the
evaluation of whether, in concrete cases, a particular service
or resource must be provided by the state to the applicants.9"

rejection of the concept, and appear to find some merit in the concept itself, albeit
not as a tool for socio-economic rights adjudication in the South African context.
See Wesson, supra note 75, at 300-05 (preferring the court's reasonable measures
approach, but criticizing the court for speculating that defining a minimum core
would be "impossible").
90. Liebenberg, supra note 87, at 175. Similarly, Bilchitz says that:
Imposing a minimum core obligation would have had the benefit that the
state would have been provided with a more definite standard against which
to judge its behaviour. Thus, instead of merely being implored to be
'reasonable,' the state would have been required to ensure that people have
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In the opinion of its proponents, if the court articulated a minimum
core of socio-economic rights, all branches of government would
engage in a more active dialogue or trialogue with each other. 91 The
vision is that of a government with all its branches engaged in a cooperative attempt, a grand joint venture, to alleviate poverty and
ameliorate the suffering caused by poverty.

III. CRITIQUING THE CRITICS AND THE
MINIMUM CORE
There are significant conceptual flaws with the minimum core
concept. I believe that the court's unwillingness to adopt the
minimum core approach stems from an intellectual discomfort that it
has not yet fully been able to articulate, not for lack of candor, but
for want of opportunity to reflect fully on the contradictions inherent
in the concept, and from its reluctance to expose the starkly
utilitarian choices that inform the allocation of resources among the
beneficiaries of socio-economic rights. 92
The conceptual problems are particularly apparent in relation to
the right to health care. The minimum core approach would require
that the court distinguish between minimum, or essential, levels of
health care versus non-essential forms of health care. I will call this
the "outer" core in contrast to the minimum core. The idea has its
genesis in General Comment 3 of the Committee on Economic,

Social and Cultural Rights, 93 where the Committee states that:
'effective protection from the elements and basic services, such as toilets and
running water.'
Bilchitz, supra note 74, at 500.
91. See Dennis Davis, Address at the University of Cape Town: SocioEconomic Rights in South Africa: The Record After Ten Years, 62-63 (2004).
92. See Karl E. Klare, Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14
SAJHR 146, 161-64, 187 (1998), who feels that the Constitutional Court fails to
candidly acknowledge the political character of constitutional decision-making. A
recognition of the political nature of constitutional decision-making will, argues
Klare, lead both to a more transparent and more transformative bench. Id.
93. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural
Rts., General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, U.N.
Doc. E/C.12/1990/8 (Dec. 14, 1990) [hereinafter General Comment 3]; see also
ECOSOC, Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., General Comment No. 14: The
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4
(Aug. 11, 2000) [hereinafter General Comment 14].
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On the basis of the extensive experience gained by the
Committee, as well as by the body that preceded it, over a
period of more than a decade of examining States parties'
reports the Committee is of the view that a minimum core
obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least,
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent
upon every State party. .

.

. By the same token, it must be

noted that any assessment as to whether a State has
discharged its minimum core obligation must also take
account of resource constraints applying within the country
concerned.... In order for a State party to be able to attribute

its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a
lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every
effort has been made to use all resources that are at its
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those
minimum obligations.

Similarly, the Committee underlines the fact that even in
times of severe resources constraints whether caused by a
process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other
factors the vulnerable members of society can and indeed
must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost
targeted programmes.94
Both the Committee and scholars are not always clear as to
whether their conception of the right is an absolute or a relative
one.95 In other words, is the content of the minimum core itself
determined by the state's resources, such that the minimum core
differs between countries depending on their respective wealth? Or,
is the minimum core an absolute, in the sense that it is identical for
all states? 96
94. General Comment 3, supra note 93,
10, 12.
95. On this distinction, see Scott & Alston, supra note 32, at 250, explaining
that a wealthy country's relative minimum core will "go considerably beyond the
absolute core minimum," while a developing country's relative minimum core may
extend no further than the core universal minimum itself
96. Both General Comment 3 and General Comment 14 suggest that there is a
singular, universal minimum core. General Comment 3 and General Comment 14
differ somewhat however in that General Comment 3 recognizes explicitly that a
state may be unable to meet even its minimum core obligations as a result of
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If there is such a thing as the minimum core, it is meaningful for
minimum core "activists" only if it is an absolute core and not
relative to the state's resources. If it is relative then it is redundant
because the court's reasonableness test, under which the content of
the right itself is determined by the available resources, already
performs the same function.97 All it can mean then is that a state must
use all the resources it has availablefor health care, on health care. In
other words, what the state can provide, it must provide. This is no
different than asking whether a policy or program is reasonable
having regard to the resources that are available. The minimum
core would then necessarily be a shifting target, its boundaries
determined by what the particular state could afford to provide. The
minimum core in an impoverished least developed country would not
be the same as the minimum core in a wealthy country.98 This would
mean that there is not a singular minimum core, but rather a
continuum. Accordingly, every single component of health care
would need to be ranked along this continuum, with the state obliged
to commence its fulfillment of the obligation at the bottom of the
continuum.9 9 Following the logic of this approach, if a sufficiently
resource constraints, whereas General Comment 14 suggests that there are nonderogable components within the minimum core that must be met, irrespective of
resource constraints. See General Comment 3, supra note 93,
10; General
Comment 14, supra note 93,
43, 47.
97. See Gov't of the Republic of S. Afr. v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46
(CC) at 70 (S.Afr.) (recognizing that "both the content of the obligation.., as well
as the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the result are governed
by the availability of resources"); see also Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 19 (stressing
that the court effectively defines the state's obligation by first determining the
availability of the state's resources).
98. For example, France's government spent $1786 per capita on health care in
2002 and had an under-five mortality rate of five per thousand in 2003. This is in
stark contrast to a country such as Ghana, whose government was only able to
spend $7 per capita on health care in 2002 and had an under-five mortality rate of
ninety-five per thousand in 2003. Therefore, Ghana's minimum core obligation in
regard to children's health care would be considerably less than France's
obligations since it has less available resources. See The World Health
Organization, The World Health Report 2005: Make Every Mother and Child
Count, 176, 201 (2005) availableat http://www.who.int/whr/2005/en/.
99. See Scott & Alston, supra note. 32, at 250, who suggest that there is a
universal absolute minimum core that all states must fulfil, but that the minimum
obligation increases commensurate with a state's resources. This attempts to
reconcile both the absolute and relative conceptions of the minimum core so as to
make sense of the present ambiguity in the General Comments and other scholars'

2006]

IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

wealthy state existed that could afford to meet its citizens every
medically-prescribed health care need, the minimum and the
maximum would be one and the same. The reverse, for an
impoverished state, would of course be equally true.
On the other hand, what is the minimum core if it is absolute so
that there is an inherent and inflexible universal set of entitlements
within health care that represent the minimum each individual needs
to lead a dignified life, determined apart from the state's available
resources?' ° No one has been able to provide a satisfactory answer
to this question.
What is clear is that the minimum core requires a ranking of
interests. Urgent interests need to be prioritized. As Bilchitz says,
"[t]he idea of a minimum core obligation suggests that there are
degrees of fulfilment of a right and that a certain minimum level of
fulfilment takes priority over a more extensive realisation of the
right." 1 Liebenberg adds, "the underlying purpose of recognising
minimum core obligations can guide the evaluation of whether, in
concrete cases, a particularservice or resource must be provided by
the state to the applicants."'' 0 2
But on what basis are interests to be ranked? How should "urgent"
interests be distinguished from less-urgent interests? After all,
problems relating to the fulfillment of socio-economic rights
ordinarily arise when there is greater need than resources. There is a
distinct lack of specificity, in both academics' and the Committee's
comments, on how competing interests should be ranked. The
Committee's guidance is so general that while it may be helpful for
national policy makers designing national health care programs, 0 3 it
interpretations thereof.
100. The danger in the "absolute" approach, for individuals in comparatively
wealthy countries, is that a state will be seen to have fulfilled its main
responsibility by providing the minimum core, and the "outer" core will come to
be seen as luxury entitlements, as a result of which realization of the "outer" core
will be subject to lower standard of scrutiny. See Danie Brand, The Minimum Core
Content of the Right to Food in Context: A Response to Rolf Kiinnemann, in
EXPLORING THE CORE CONTENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: SOUTH AFRICAN

AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES,

supra note 7, at 99, 106-08.

101. Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 13.
102. Liebenberg, supra note 87, at 175 (emphasis added).
103. Similarly, Dworkin's "prudent-insurer" model may be equally helpful for
national policymakers designing a universal health care system because it is based
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is singularly unhelpful for courts and decision-makers faced with the
type of hard choices that come before the courts. The obligations
outlined in General Comment 14 provide benchmarks against which
the overarching reasonableness of a national health strategy may be
evaluated. However, these obligations do not identify the exact
parameters of the minimum core advocated for by the committee and
human rights scholars.104 In the context of the right to the highest
attainable standard of health, the Committee identifies core
obligations that it says are non-derogable, for which non-compliance
cannot be justified under any circumstances.105 These core
obligations are:
(a) to ensure the right of access to health facilities, goods and
services on a non-discriminatory basis, especially for
vulnerable or marginalized groups;
(b) to ensure access to the minimum essential food which is
nutritionally adequate and safe, to ensure freedom from
hunger to everyone;
(c) to ensure access to basic shelter, housing and sanitation,
and an adequate supply of safe and potable water;
(d) to provide essential drugs, as from time to time defined by
the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs;
(e) to ensure equitable distribution of all health facilities,
goods and services;
(f) to adopt and implement a national public health strategy
and plan of action [which meets certain specified criteria]. 0 6

on a set of assumptions about the utilitarian choices that individuals would make
for themselves when allocating their own resources. It is, however, an
inappropriate model for the judiciary to use. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN
VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2000).
104. See General Comment 14, supra note 93,
43-45.
105. Id. 47.
106. Id. 43.

2006]

IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Apart from identifying the provision of essential medicines as one
component of the right, the remaining core components are simply
restatements and elaborations of other rights contained in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." 7
What the core obligations do not do is assist decision-makers, in
concrete cases, determine whether a particular claimant's need for
health care must, as a matter of right, be prioritized over another
claimant's health care needs.
Similarly, domestic human rights scholars provide the court with
little in the way of concrete guidance, and suggest that utilizing and
developing the minimum core concept does not require that they do
so. These scholars feel that the court need only lay down general
principles that will guide policy makers in the allocative choices they
make.
[A]n acceptance of the concept of minimum core obligations
does not require the Court to define in abstract the [precise]
basket of goods and services that must be provided. Instead, it
could define the general principles underlying the concept of
minimum core obligations in relation to socio-economic
rights and apply these [contextually] on a case-by-case
basis. '°
In Treatment Action Campaign, the amici argued that the
minimum core represented the "minimum decencies of life consistent
with human dignity" because "[n]o one should be condemned to a
life below the basic level of dignified human existence."10 9 Bilchitz
argues that the minimum core of a right represents those aspects
necessary to protect the "survival interests" of the poor. Specifically,
he says that:
In the context of socio-economic rights, there are indeed
interests that can be classified as of great urgency and that
must be realised as a matter of priority in order to ensure
survival. If anything deserves to be designated a core aspect
107. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, at 49, 50-51 U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec.
16, 1966) arts. 11- 12.
108. Liebenberg, supra note 82, at 33-31.
109. Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002
(5) SA 721 (CC) at 738 (S. Aft.).
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of a right, then survival interests are the most likely
candidates for such a role.

The minimum core approach does require us to take a rigid
stance in one respect: it requires us to recognise that it is
simply unacceptable for any human being to have to live
without sufficient resources to maintain their survival. 110
The lack of specificity from those who urge the adoption of the
minimum core, and who themselves argue that it requires a ranking
of interests, is unsurprising. For no principled basis exists on which
the court can rank the interests of claimants when their interests are
incommensurable.
How are the principles developed by the Human Rights
Committee and by human rights scholars any less vague than the
reasonableness criterion? Do the principles articulated by scholars
help decision-makers, or the courts, choose between renal dialysis
for a terminally-ill patient with poor prospects for survival and a
patient with slightly better, but not guaranteed, prospects for
survival? Do the principles help in ranking the interests a cancer
patient has in receiving chemotherapy treatment with the interests an
individual has in receiving anti-retroviral treatment, or in ranking the
interests a tuberculosis sufferer has in receiving medication from the
interest a cholera sufferer has in receiving treatment? From the
perspective of the individual sufferer, their subjective interests in
receiving treatment are equal. If they do not receive the required
treatment, they are likely to die sooner than they would if they
receive treatment. Take a completely different example, in which the
"apparent" interests are not equal: For instance, an HIV positive
patient's interest in receiving anti-retroviral medicine versus a
chronic migraine sufferer's interest in receiving migraine treatment
because their quality of life is seriously and adversely impaired. The
HIV positive patient's life may be extended significantly if she
receives anti-retroviral medicine. The migraine sufferer's quality of
life will be improved significantly if she receives migraine
110. Bilchitz, supra note 8, at 14-15.
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medication. Under Bilchitz's formulation, and perhaps most
individual's immediate compassionate response, the HIV positive
patient's claim must be prioritized. But if that choice would condemn
the migraine sufferer to a life of suffering, where her dignity and
quality of life was seriously eroded, can one still so readily argue that
the one claim inherently trumps the other? Must life always prevail
over quality of life? Bilchitz's formulation would, surely, lead to a
situation in the health care context where the government must
prioritize "terminal illnesses" above other interests, an approach the
court expressly and appropriately rejected in Soobramoney. "
These examples expose the impossibility of trying to locate, within
the right itself, what are, from the perspective of individual sufferers,
equally compelling interests. And in the human rights arena, the
perspective that matters is the individual's, not the collective's. The
essence of human rights is that the individual interest trumps those of
the collective. Limitations on an individual's rights need to be
separately and specifically justified under the limitation's clause."2
And it is here that the proponents of the minimum core idea go
wrong because they try to locate these choices within the right itself,
when they cannot be so located. The real problem in adjudicating
socio-economic rights is the conceptual or ideological tension
between rights on the one hand, and rights limited (or negated) by
resource constraints on the other. Now, it is of course trite to say that
the real problem in South Africa, as in most parts of the world, is one
of limited resources. Resource constraints are real, practical, and
unavoidable problems that require all those with small purses and
larger needs to make difficult choices regarding how to best spend
the money they have. It is no answer to say that South Africa is in
fact resource-rich, and that the problem lies with how resources are
111. Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)
at 771-72 (S. Aft.) (reasoning that "prioritising the treatment of terminal illness
over other forms of medical care . . . would reduce the resources available to the
State for purposes such as preventative health care and medical treatment for
persons suffering from illnesses or bodily infirmities which are not life
threatening").
112. S. AFR. CONST. 1996, § 36 (listing "the nature of the right; the importance
of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the limitation; the relation
between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means to achieve the
purpose" as factors to be weighed when determining the reasonableness of a
limitation of rights).
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distributed rather than the size of the resource-pot. The same issues
arise in comparatively wealthy countries, the difference being one of
scale.
The problem, however, goes beyond the practical reality to the
unacknowledged and, I would say, irresoluble problem that in any
resource constrained society there is a conflict between the
constitutional commitment to individual human rights and the
utilitarian philosophy that necessity informs the government's choice
as to how to maximize the welfare of the greatest number. Quite
simply, it means that even though all individuals are supposed to be
equal holders of the same right, and that notwithstanding the fact that
each of us has an equal interest in having that right realized, the right
of one individual to receive the promised good will be sacrificed if
the welfare of the majority requires it. Each individual has a right of
access to health care, and yet the unfortunate reality is that one
individual's right to the exact same socio-economic good, health
care, may be deliberately sacrificed so that others can receive the
benefits of the right instead. 13 The idea that one individual's rights
may be sacrificed for another's is inimical to the very purpose a
rights-based system is intended to serve. Clearly, it is not possible to
argue that there are gradations of interest within the right to health
care such that one can say that the right to health care itself means
that Ms. X is entitled to dialysis treatment but that Mr. Soobramoney
is not. If both are in need of dialysis treatment, if dialysis treatment
would alleviate both their suffering and prolong their lives, it cannot
be said that Ms. X has a right to dialysis treatment and Mr.
Soobramoney does not. Their subjective interest in receiving
treatment is identical. The considerations that inform the decision as
to which one of them will have their right realized is external to their
subjective interest. It is entirely utilitarian. Mr. Soobramoney was
told that he was to die so that others might live.

113. See Soobramoney 1998 (1) SA at 775-77 (stating that the limited number of

dialysis machines can better serve the public when used to actually cure people
that may be less sick, instead of being used for maintaining the life of those with
advanced chronic illnesses that will never be fully cured); Treatment Action
Campaign 2002 (5) SA at 740 (citing with approval Soobramoney's conclusion
that limited resources may require decision makers to focus on the benefits to
society in general, instead of on the needs of certain individuals).
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Bilchitz fails to recognize this because he believes that a minimum
core will protect the individual against the collective interest." 4 In
criticizing Justice Yacoob's statement in Grootboom that the state's
housing program might have been acceptable, despite its failure to
cater for those in need of emergency shelter, if it would have
provided affordable housing for most people within a reasonably
short time, Bilchitz writes:
Even if housing could be achieved for most people in a
reasonable time, it would never be acceptable for some to
have to suffer the dire effects of not being protected from the
elements or not having their other basic needs met. This is
one of the prime reasons for the protection of socio-economic
entitlements in the form of rights. Collective goals cannot
outweigh protections for the most basic interests of
individuals.'

Yet the minimum core does not protect the individual against the
collective; it justifies the sacrifice of certain individuals on grounds
that are apparently principled, but which are in reality merely
utilitarian. In relation to housing, it may be possible to say that those
without shelter have greater need than those with imperfect shelter.
In relation to the right to food, it may be possible to say that those
without food have greater need than those with weeviled food. In
relation to the right to education, it may be possible to say that those
without primary education have greater need than those seeking
tertiary education. But what if the education needed is expensive
special schooling for a disabled child? What if the choice is between
one imperfectly housed person and another? Between a family of
three in a two-bed roomed house that lacks running water and
sanitation, and a family of ten squeezed into a two-bedroom house
with running water and sanitation? Between a family living in a cold
and leaking shack, as millions of South Africans do, and a family
living on the street? What if the choice is between those who are
malnourished and those who are under-nourished? How does one
find the answer to these questions within the right itself? f6
114.
115.
Afr. v
116.

See Bilchitz, supra note 74, at 499.
See id. (citing Justice Yacobs' decision from Gov't of the Republic of S.
Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 78-79 (S.Afr.).
The impossibility of defining the minimum core in abstract terms is well-
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The point about socio-economic rights, after all, is that it is the
bundle of socio-economic goods, collectively, that constitute the
minimum necessary for an adequate standard of living. An adequate
standard of living requires adequate housing, adequate clothing,
adequate food, an adequate standard of education, and so forth. The
minimum required is that which is adequate. Less than adequate is
inadequate. The right, and the minimum core, are the same.
This is not to say that interests within a right cannot be prioritized.
Merely that the prioritization of certain interests over others is
informed by pragmatic, utilitarian considerations. The decision to
prioritize primary health care over tertiary health care, or the
provision of medicines deemed essential by the World Health
Organisation, are examples of precisely that kind of prioritization.
The decision to prioritize certain interests is eminently rational and
reasonable. An executive cannot be faulted for doing so, provided its
choices are rational and reasonable. The judiciary's power to
scrutinize those choices must be limited to ensuring that the policy is
rational and reasonable. The judiciary cannot set aside a policy that is
rational and reasonable on the basis that the right itself requires a
different ranking of interests. The right is the bundle of all those
interests; therefore, there is no basis for the claim that the appropriate
ranking is located within the right itself.
The unavoidable utilitarianism that would inform the ranking of
socio-economic interests is quite different than the balancing of
interests that informs the limitation of a civil and political right
permitted under section 36 of the Constitution," 7 which says that
rights may be limited when this is necessary in the interests of a just
and democratic society. One person's right to freedom of expression
may be limited where the expression takes the form of hate speech,
which will be detrimental to the attainment of a just and equitable
society founded on respect for and tolerance of others of a different
caste, creed, color etc. The person's right to freedom of speech is not
negated, even if that right does not include the right to engage in hate
illustrated by Brand's statement that defining minimum core rights, such as the

right to food, in an abstract manner is difficult because "[w]hat actually matters...
are the specific entitlements and specific duties of conduct implied by the

minimum standard of freedom from hunger in real-time, specific situations").
Brand, supra note 100, at 102-06.
117. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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speech. The individual's freedom of expression to engage in nonhate speech is unaffected. And, importantly, the limitation can be
justified as being in the individual's interest as well as in the
collective's interest, for the individual has as great an interest in the
maintenance of a just and equitable democracy as the collective does.
When an individual's right to health care is held to not include the
right to receive renal dialysis, chemotherapy, or whatever form of
medical treatment that individual needs, it is disingenuous to argue
that the "balance" of her right remains unimpaired. If an individual
needs specific treatment, which she will not receive, it cannot be said
that the right has only been limited, and that the 'balance' somehow
survives. For an individual with an unrealized specific need, the right
has been negated. She has not received the health care she needs. She
has no right to health care that she does not need. Also, one cannot
argue that the individual's overarching interest is served in that the
utilitarian allocation is necessary for the maintenance of a just and
equitable democracy. For the individual may not be alive to enjoy
that democracy.I 8 The allocation is only justified when it serves the
collective's interest, not the individual's interest. The ranking is
based on considerations external to the individual sufferer, most
notably the cost involved in providing the required treatment, and the
costs to the economy as a whole if the problem is not addressed.
Since these considerations simply cannot be located within the right
itself, it cannot be the court's business to decide those choices. The
court's role is to enforce individual human rights, not to identify
which individuals' interests should be sacrificed to the collective's.

IV. TOWARDS A MORE ROBUST APPROACH
The true difficulty, in relation to socio-economic rights, is not that
the scope and content of the particular right needs still to be
determined through judicial interpretation. The true difficulty is that
the state's failure to provide the promised goods is excused if the
state does not have the resources available to do so. The silent
premise in socio-economic rights litigation is that the executive is in
118. As John Maynard Keynes famously observed when criticizing economists
who believed that in the long-run market failures self-correct without government
intervention: "But this long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long
run we are all dead." JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM
88 (1924).
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breach of its constitutional obligation to individual litigants because
there are additional resources available for the provision of social
goods. Litigants would not approach the court to instruct the
executive to increase taxation so as to increase the size of the public
purse. Just as the court will not directly order the executive to change
its macroeconomic policies, so too the court cannot be expected to
make orders that may have the effect of obliging the executive to do
so. Therefore, the additional resources must come from within the
existing resource pool. To be effective, litigation must identify that
source. And yet, to date, human rights scholars and activists seem to
accept both that the court's remit is limited to testing the
constitutionality of specific policies and programs on their own
merits, and that its remit does not include scrutinizing how the public
purse is spent. It certainly follows that a court cannot, in the ordinary
course of things, determine the reasonableness of program or policyspecific budgetary allocations. In other words, it cannot determine
whether the allocation of a particular sum of money for the
implementation of a particular program is reasonable, for that would
potentially require that it examine each and every budgetary
allocation that has been made to each and every program. 1 9 The
court would be required to examine every budgetary allocation
because it could only conclude that the sums committed to one
program were inadequate if it first satisfies itself that the sums
committed to another program were profligate. It could, for example,
only conclude that the sum committed to the provision of
radiotherapy was unreasonable if it concluded that the sums
committed to the provision of ante-natal care or another program
were excessive. Similarly, the court could only conclude that the
national housing expenditure was inadequate and thus unreasonable
if it first decided that a national expenditure in another area was
unreasonable for being profligate. At the level of specific programs,
evaluating the reasonableness of budgetary allocations would thus be
an impossible task. It is less clear to me that it would be impossible
at the macro level, at the level of scrutinizing macro-budgetary
allocations, provided the court is not comparing one socio-economic
expenditure with another. 20
119. See Liebenberg, supra note 82, at 33-30 to -31.
120. See Darrel Moellendorf, Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and
the Futureof Socio-Economic Rights Claims, 14 SAHJR 327, 330-33 (1998).
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Assuming all government departments act in good faith when
making their allocative decisions, as they undoubtedly do,' 21 it would
be impossible for the court to decide that too little money is being
spent on the provision of housing and too much on the provision of
education. Since there is no ranking of socio-economic rights and
because all the rights collectively constitute the minimum necessary
for a reasonable quality of life, any diversion of funds from one right
to another would necessarily be arbitrary, irrational, and
unreasonable. 2 2 There are, however, many claims on the public
purse besides those that directly implicate the fulfillment of a right.
And there seems to me no reason, in principle, why the court could
not scrutinize the reasonableness of those budgetary allocations. The
state, after all, has a constitutional duty to meet the socio-economic
needs of its peoples. It recognizes that socio-economic rights,
together with civil and political rights, are cornerstones of
democracy. There is no suggestion in the Constitution that the
maintenance of democracy requires that R587 million be spent on the
acquisition of an airplane for presidential use,123 or that R50 billion
be spent on the acquisition of arms.'24 As long as the socio-economic
needs of individuals remain unfulfilled, expenditures such as these
require explanation. In determining whether a particular expenditure
that does not involve the fulfillment of a right is reasonable, account
must be taken of the fact that it is a non-rights expenditure.

121. See Geoff Budlender, Socio-Economic Rights in the New Millennium: The
Challenges of Implementation in SA, ECON. & Soc. REv., Mar. 1999,
http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/esr1999/1999march budlender.php
(depicting health, housing, and land officials as honest and desiring to use their
positions to help the public receive land, housing, and health care).
122. Unless, of course, a very anomalous situation had arisen in which resource
allocation was far in excess of present needs, where, for example, very few
individuals required housing but many required education, in spite of which
funding for both remained equal.
123. See, e.g., Jonathon Katzenellenbogen, Mbeki's Jet Flies Into Storm of
Criticism, BUSINESS DAY (S. Afr.), Oct. 23, 2002, at 11, available at
http://www.businessday.co.za/Articles/TarkArticle.aspx?ID=633201;
John Scott,
Mbeki's Jet is Just a Cut Below the Best, INDEPENDENT ONLINE (S. Aft.), Oct. 25,
2002,
http://www.int.iol.co.za/index.php?setid= 1&clickid= 1&art-id=qw10355207401
15S300.
124. Nathan Geffen, The Arms Deal and HIVAIDS, AFR. GENDER INST.
NEWSL.,
Dec.
2001,
7,
at
8,
available
at
http://web.uct.ac.za/org/agi/pubs/newsletters/vol9/arms.htm.
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Therefore, account must be taken of the purpose of the expenditure,
and to what extent the expenditure is necessary in order for the
executive to fulfill its constitutionally-entrusted duties to the peoples
of South Africa. The court would have little difficulty in finding that
a father's purchase of the latest BMW is unreasonable if it means
that his children are reduced to a diet of bread, water, and gruel;
unless the BMW is necessary to provide even that marginal level of
sustenance for the children. Yet, when the "father" is the executive,
the court will not enquire into the reasonableness of these
expenditures for political and pragmatic reasons. Accepting the
proposition that the executive must answer for such expenditures
does not imply that the determination will always go against the
executive. The expenditure may nevertheless be found to be
reasonable, notwithstanding the urgency of individuals' socioeconomic needs. Most human rights scholars appear to accept the
court's self-imposed restraint, 25 for it is not this aspect of the court's
jurisprudence that they criticize. It is this, however, that they should
criticize.

CONCLUSION
The true discontent that informs constitutional adjudication about
socio-economic rights is with the government's macro-economic
policy choices and with the government's broad budgetary
allocations. It is with the choice of neo-liberal macro-economic
policies that prioritize growth rather than redistribution, and with the
government's decision to spend twice as much on defense than on
either the provision of education and health.'26 The former are not

125. With the notable exception of the challenge to South Africa's estimated
$280 billion arms deal by the South African branch of Economists Allied For
Arms Reduction. See Ben Maclennan, Arms Deal Ruling to be Challenged, MAIL
4,
2004
&
GUARDIAN
ONLINE
(S.
Aft.),
Mar.

http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspxarticleid=43950&area=/2fbreaking-news
%2fbreaking-news__national%2f;

Donwald Pressly, Manuel Hails Failure of

Arms Application, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (S.

Afr.), Mar. 4, 2004,

http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=43920&area=%2fbreaking-news
%2fbreakingnews__national%2f.
126. The projected expenditure for defense for the 2004/05 budget year was
R22.5 billion, while for education and health it was respectively R11.1 billion and
R9.9 billion. The housing budget was R5.3 billion. See NATIONAL TREASURY,
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open to constitutional challenge, but why should the latter not be? On
the face of it these are choices that should outrage. Critiquing the
court for its refusal to adopt jurisprudentially dubious reasoning is
misdirected. The minimum core concept is inherently flawed and its
adoption could lead to outcomes that exacerbate rather than alleviate
poverty as spending is shifted from one type of social spending to
another, from less-urgent social needs to more-urgent social needs,
rather than from an inessential to an essential expenditure. A
minimum core strategy may help some poor, but it may well be at the
expense of other poor. Zero-sum litigation will not benefit the poor.
If it is disproportionate defense spending that is hurting the
homeless, jobless, and those without adequate water, sanitation, and
education, then it is that disproportionate spending that should be
challenged, and the court's refusal to entertain such challenges that
should be criticized.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA ESTIMATES OF NATIONAL EXPENDITURE xii (2003),

available at www.treasury.gov.za/documents/budget/2003/ene/forward.pdf.

